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AI’s Risky Business: 
Embracing Ambiguity in Managing the Risks of AI 
RYAN BUDISH*© 
Abstract 
There are over 160 different sets of artificial intelligence (AI) governance 
principles from public and private organizations alike. These principles aspire to 
enhance AI’s transformative potential and limit its negative consequences. 
Increasingly, these principles and strategies have invoked the language of “risk 
management” as a mechanism for articulating concrete guardrails around AI 
technologies. Unfortunately, what “risk management” means in practice is largely 
undefined and poorly understood. In fact, there are two very different approaches to 
how we measure risk. One approach emphasizes quantification and certainty. The 
other approach eschews the false certainty of quantification and instead embraces the 
inherently qualitative (and correspondingly imprecise) measures of risk expressed 
through social and political dialogue across stakeholders. This paper argues that the 
emerging field of AI governance should embrace a more responsive, inclusive, and 
qualitative approach that is better tailored to the inherent uncertainties and dynamism 
of AI technology and its societal impacts. And yet this paper also describes how 
doing so will be difficult because computer science and digital technologies (and, by 
extension, efforts to govern those technologies) inherently push toward certainty and 
the elimination of ambiguity. This paper draws upon experiences from other 
scientific fields that have long had to grapple with how best to manage the risks of 
new technologies to show how qualitative approaches to risk may be better tailored 
to the challenges of emerging technologies like AI, despite the potential tradeoffs of 
unpredictability and uncertainty.  
 
 © Ryan Budish, 2021. 
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I. Introduction 
As of April 2020 there are, by one count, over 160 different sets of artificial 
intelligence (AI) governance principles, representing efforts from around the world, 
and from public and private organizations alike. What unites them is their attempt to 
grapple with the uncertain possibilities, both good and bad, latent within AI 
technologies.1 From behind a veil of ignorance, uncertain about how AI technologies 
will develop and evolve in practice, these documents seek to create governance 
frameworks that will both enable and enhance AI’s transformative potential and limit 
its negative consequences.2 Given the conditions of uncertainty, these principles and 
strategies have increasingly grasped for the language of “risk management” as a 
mechanism for articulating concrete guardrails around the ephemeral cloud of 
technological possibility.3 A review of 35 of the most significant sets of AI principles 
shows around a third of them urge the adoption of “risk management” approaches 
for AI governance, but what “risk management” means in practice is largely 
undefined and poorly understood.4 
Although an increasing number of AI governance frameworks are using the 
language of “risk,” there exists no consensus understanding or definition about what 
“risk” means.5 This is a problem for risk-based approaches to AI governance because 
there are in fact two very different possible approaches to how we measure risk.6 One 
approach emphasizes quantification and certainty.7 In this approach, policymakers 
and practitioners evaluate risks that can be scientifically and mathematically 
calculated and modeled.8 The other approach eschews the false certainty of 
quantification and instead embraces the inherently qualitative (and correspondingly 
imprecise) measures of risk expressed through social and political dialogue across 
stakeholders.9 Although they share the common language of “risk,” these are very 
different approaches.10 The choice between them is consequential; it determines the 
kinds of evidence and harms that matter, the kinds of experts whose input is 
considered, and ultimately the kinds of governance approaches that will be used.11 
This paper argues that the emerging field of AI governance should embrace a more 
 
 1. See AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory, ALGORIGHTMWATCH, https://inventory.algorithmwatch.org 
(last updated Apr. 2020). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. See infra Part III.B. 
 9. See infra Part III.C. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
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responsive, inclusive, and qualitative approach that is better tailored to the inherent 
and inescapable uncertainties and dynamism of AI technology and its societal 
impacts.12 And yet doing so will be difficult because computer science and digital 
technologies (and, by extension, efforts to govern those technologies) inherently 
push toward certainty and the elimination of ambiguity.13 To overcome this path 
dependency, policymakers and leaders advocating for a risk-based approach to AI 
governance must first recognize that there are competing conceptions of risk, and 
then actively choose between them.14 
The pull toward a quantified measure of risk will be hard to overcome, because 
for computer scientists and programmers, ambiguity is often incompatible with the 
necessities of code.15 The ambiguity of a concept like fairness, human rights, ethics, 
or even ambiguity in law itself is often incompatible with the practicalities of code.16 
As a result, policymakers also seek certainty: desiring to create bright lines rules that 
can be easily followed by both the programmers who must make decisions expressed 
in math and logic, and the judges and regulators who must apply law to evaluate 
those decisions.17 Professor Lawrence Lessig described two kinds of code: (1) East 
Coast code expressed in law and regulation and (2) West Coast code expressed in 
bits and bytes.18 And, increasingly, there is a desire for rules that are equally 
expressible in both.19 
This quest for certainty is understandable but misplaced in that it places law and 
policy in service of technology and not the other way around. Although legal code 
that is mathematically expressible makes it easier to operationalize and implement 
policy choices, ease of use for computer scientists and engineers should not be the 
sole or even the primary criteria in crafting the policies that govern AI and emerging 
technologies. Certainty is an illusion when it comes to governing AI and other 
emerging technologies.20 These technologies are neither fixed in time nor place, 
meaning that the appropriate legal and policy response must be equally dynamic and 
responsive. First, these technologies are not fixed in time: these technologies are 
rapidly evolving, meaning that a governance approach that makes sense today may 
 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See Arvind Narayanan, FAT* 2018 Translation Tutorial: 21 Definitions of Fairness and Their Politics, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqamrPkF5kk. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See, e.g., Kobbi Nissim et al., Bridging the Gap between Computer Science and Legal Approaches to 
Privacy, 31 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 687, 733–34 (2018), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/37355739. 
 18. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). 
 19. See, e.g., Nissim et al., supra note 17 at 733–34. 
 20. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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not be equally appropriate tomorrow.21 And second, these technologies are not fixed 
in place: they are highly contextual.22 An AI technology, for example, that works 
well for one population or with one geography, may have significant negative 
impacts elsewhere.23 All of this argues in support of flexible, agile, dynamic, 
political, contextual, messy, unpredictable, multistakeholder, and ultimately 
uncertain governance approaches.24 
This issue of how to define and measure risk, however, is not unique to AI 
governance. Other scientific fields like nanotechnology, biology, environmental 
science, and others have long had to grapple with how best to manage the risks of 
new technologies — technologies like synthetic DNA and viruses — that have the 
potential to be positively transformative, but also carry the possibility of existential 
threat, even if that risk is remote.25 Across those fields they have debated risk 
governance approaches to new technologies and the particular problem of how to 
respond to risk when the probabilities may be unknown.26 Numerous examples 
across many scientific disciplines, and in many different parts of the world, show 
how qualitative approaches to risk may be better tailored to the challenges of 
emerging technologies, despite the potential tradeoffs of unpredictability and 
uncertainty.27 
What makes AI different than these other fields, however, is that perhaps, more 
than other scientific fields, the greatest risks posed by AI are inherently human risks 
and not technical, chemical, physical, or biological ones.28 How do we define 
concepts like ethics, justice, and fairness? And in pursuit of those goals what costs 
— financial, temporal, emotional — are we willing to bear? What limits will we 
place upon automation at the costs of efficiencies and profits? What weight will we 
give to automated decisions? To manage the risks of AI we ultimately need a 
 
 21. See, e.g., Karen Hao, This is how we lost control of our faces, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 5, 2021), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/05/1017388/ai-deep-learning-facial-recognition-data-history/ 
(describing rapid advancements in facial recognition technology). 
 22. Mimi Onuoha, Side-by-side images expose a glitch in Google’s maps, QUARTZ (June 6, 2017), 
https://qz.com/982709/google-maps-is-making-entire-communities-invisible-the-consequences-are-worrying/ 
(noting how autonomous vehicles and drones will not work in places that are not mapped, such as favelas in 
Brazil). 
 23. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (noting racial 
disparities in automated risk scoring systems). 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part III.C. 
 28. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449 (May 
21, 2019) (describing how AI “may have disparate effects within, and between societies and economies, notably 
regarding economic shifts, competition, transitions in the labour market, inequalities, and implications for 
democracy and human rights, privacy and data protection, and digital security . . . .”). 
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governance system that lets us manage the risks of being human in an imperfect and 
uncertain world. 
II. Risk Management for AI: Global Principles for AI  
With the rapid progress, development, adoption, and use of AI technologies, 
policymakers around the world have been scrambling to catch up and articulate 
frameworks that can both enable AI’s greatest benefits, constrain its greatest negative 
impacts, and remain flexible enough to adapt to the technology’s future evolutions. 
The result so far has been a proliferation of high-level principles and strategies that 
remain light on operational guidance.29 One inventory of such frameworks curated 
by the German NGO AlgorithmWatch has collected over 160 examples,30 and the 
OECD’s AI Policy Observatory identified over 300 AI governance instruments 
across national and regional AI strategies.31 Although there are differences in terms 
of how these documents are counted and classified, what is clear is that questions of 
AI governance are increasingly concerning to both public and private sector 
decisionmakers and leaders. 
Although these numerous frameworks have important differences, some common 
themes are starting to emerge. Jessica Fjeld and a team of researchers at the Berkman 
Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University looked at 35 of some of 
the most significant sets of AI principles and from that identified eight key themes 
embedded across these documents: privacy, accountability, safety and security, 
transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, human control of 
technology, professional responsibility, and the promotion of human values.32 Fjeld 
observes that the more recent documents cover more of these themes “suggesting 
that the conversation around principled AI is beginning to converge.”33 
In addition to those eight themes, however, there is another emerging area of 
convergence that is, as this paper argues, a bit more concerning. That area of 
convergence is increasing references to risk-based approaches to AI. In looking at 
the 35 documents that Fjeld looked at, as well as a few more recent documents, we 
see that nearly a third of them invoke “risk” as a central feature in their governance 
framework. For some of these frameworks, the references to risk governance are little 
more than a buzzword, while others offer descriptions of more detailed risk 
 
 29. AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory, supra note 1. 
 30. Jessica Fjeld et al., Principled Artificial Intelligence: Mapping Consensus in Ethical and Rights-Based 
Approaches to Principles for AI, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. INTERNET SOC’Y., Jan. 15, 2020 at 1. AI Ethics 
Guidelines Global Inventory, supra note 1. 
 31. OECD, National AI Policies and Strategies, OECD.AI POLICY OBSERVATORY, 
https://oecd.ai/dashboards (last visited May 13, 2020). 
 32. Fjeld et al., supra note 30 at 4–5. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
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governance processes. But most concerningly, none of the frameworks adequately 
explain how to define and measure risk under conditions of uncertainty. 
Most significantly, the European Commission has placed risk and risk 
management at the center of their proposed regulation about AI (the “AI Act”).34  In 
April 2021, the European Commission published their proposed legislation to 
regulate the use of AI systems in Europe.35 Following the model that the Commission 
had originally proposed in its 2020 White Paper,36 the proposed regulation in effect 
creates four categories of AI systems: (1) particularly dangerous practices that are 
prohibited;37 (2) high-risk AI systems38 that are subject to conformity assessment,39 
risk management,40 and various documentation requirements;41 (3) certain other AI 
systems, such as chatbots, that have elevated transparency requirements;42 and (4) all 
other AI systems for which there are no new obligations. Thus, distinguishing 
between high-risk and low-risk AI systems is critical to determining what obligations 
might apply under the regulation. In that regard, the proposal helpfully identifies 
eight broad categories of high-risk AI systems,43 which includes things like AI used 
in critical infrastructure,44 in education and vocational training,45 or in employment 
 
 34. Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Laying Down Harmonised 
Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, 
(2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206&from=EN (last 
visited June 23, 2021). 
 35. See id., Explanatory Memorandum at 3 (“The proposal sets harmonised rules for the development, 
placement on the market and use of AI systems in the Union following a proportionate risk-based approach. It 
proposes a single future-proof definition of AI. Certain particularly harmful AI practices are prohibited as 
contravening Union values, while specific restrictions and safeguards are proposed in relation to certain uses of 
remote biometric identification systems for the purpose of law enforcement. The proposal lays down a solid risk 
methodology to define ‘high-risk’ AI systems that pose significant risks to the health and safety or fundamental 
rights of persons. Those AI systems will have to comply with a set of horizontal mandatory requirements for 
trustworthy AI and follow conformity assessment procedures before those systems can be placed on the Union 
market.”). 
 36. European Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence - A European Approach to Excellence and 
Trust, at 1, COM (2020) 65 final (Feb. 19, 2021). 
 37. See Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Laying Down 
Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union 
Legislative Acts, (2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206&from=EN (last visited Jun 23, 2021), at Art. 5. 
 38. See id. at Annex III, Art. 7, and Chapter 2. 
 39. See id. at Art. 16(e), Art. 19, Art. 43, Annex VI, and Annex VII. 
 40. See id. at Art. 9. 
 41. See id., at Annex IV. 
 42. See id. at Art. 52. 
 43. See id. at Annex III. 
 44. See id. at Annex III(2). 
 45. See id. at Annex III(3). 
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and hiring contexts.46 Within each broad category, the proposed regulation includes 
high-risk AI systems that are considered high risk. The Commission can add 
additional high-risk AI systems, provided that the systems fit within one of the 
existing eight categories,47 and it must pose “a risk of harm to the health and safety, 
or a risk of adverse impact on fundamental rights, that is, . . . equivalent to or greater 
than the risk of harm or of adverse impact posed by the high-risk AI systems” already 
covered in the Act.48 In evaluating whether a risk is “equivalent to or greater” than 
other high-risk AI system, the Act directs the Commission to consider things like 
whether the AI system has already caused harms or “given rise to significant 
concerns in relation to the materialization” of those harms,49 the “potential extent” 
of such harm, including how many people might be impacted,50 or the extent to which 
an outcome is reversible,51 among other factors. Although the AI Act provides 
several factors to consider, it is ultimately left up to the Commission to compare 
whether a new AI system poses equal or greater risks than existing high-risk AI 
systems. 
The European Union is far from the only governmental body that has placed risk 
at the cornerstone of their AI governance framework. In January 2020, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for the United States sought comment on a 
proposed regulatory framework for AI.52 The framework stated that: “Regulatory and 
non-regulatory approaches to AI should be based on a consistent application of risk 
assessment and risk management across various agencies and various 
technologies…. [A] risk-based approach should be used to determine which risks 
are acceptable and which risks present the possibility of unacceptable harm, or harm 
that has expected costs greater than expected benefits.”53 Similar to the proposed 
European approach, the OMB framework suggests a “tiered approach” in which “AI 
applications that pose lower risks” have fewer restrictions than “higher risk AI 
applications.”54 But the OMB proposal does not provide guidance on what risk 
means, other than to acknowledge that eliminating all risk will be impossible.55  
 
 46. See id. at Annex III(4). 
 47. See id. at Art. 7(1)(a). 
 48. See id. at Art. 7(1)(b). 
 49. See id. at Art. 7(2)(c). 
 50. See id. at Art. 7(2)(d). 
 51. See id. at Art. 7(2)(g). 
 52. Memorandum on Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications from Russell T. 
Vought, Acting Dir. of the Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts 
and Agencies, (Jan. 2020) (on file at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMB-
Memo-on-Regulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf). 
 53. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 54.  Id. at 13. 
 55. See id. at 13. 
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also 
emphasizes risk management approaches to AI but goes a bit further than the US and 
the European approaches. In May 2019, the 36 member states of the OECD, along 
with 8 non-member states, adopted a set of AI principles that, in part, states that “AI 
actors should, based on their roles, the context, and their ability to act, apply a 
systematic risk management approach to each phase of the AI system lifecycle on a 
continuous basis to address risks related to AI systems, including privacy, digital 
security, safety and bias.”56 Although the OECD AI principles do not provide further 
guidance about what this “risk management approach” entails,57 concurrent with the 
release of its principles, the OECD published a report entitled Artificial Intelligence 
in Society, that outlines a six-step process that organizations can follow:  
1. Objectives: define objectives, functions or properties of the AI system, 
in context. These functions and properties may change depending on the 
phase of the AI lifecycle.  
2. Stakeholders and actors: identify stakeholders and actors involved, 
i.e., those directly or indirectly affected by the system’s functions or 
properties in each lifecycle phase.  
3. Risk assessment: assess the potential effects, both benefits and risks, 
for stakeholders and actors. These will vary depending on the 
stakeholders and actors affected, as well as the phase in the AI system 
lifecycle.  
4. Risk mitigation: identify risk mitigation strategies that are appropriate 
to, and commensurate with, the risk. These should consider factors such 
as the organisation’s goals and objectives, the stakeholders and actors 
involved, the likelihood of risks manifesting and potential benefits.  
5. Implementation: implement risk mitigation strategies.  
6. Monitoring, evaluation, and feedback: monitor, evaluate and provide 
feedback on the results of the implementation.58 
This process provides more helpful guidance than most other invocations of risk 
governance and risk management for AI. And yet even here, the guidance leaves 
unanswered several important questions about how to measure risk and how to 
develop “risk mitigation strategies that are appropriate to, and commensurate with, 
 
 56. OECD, supra note 31, at 1.4 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. 
 58. OECD, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN SOCIETY 96 (2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-
technology/artificial-intelligence-in-society_eedfee77-en. The OECD provided even more guidance on risk 
management in yet another report published along with the principles. See SCOPING THE OECD AI PRINCIPLES: 
DELIBERATIONS OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE OECD (AIGO), in 291 OECD 
DIGITAL ECONOMY PAPERS 15 (2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/scoping-the-oecd-
ai-principles_d62f618a-en. 
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the risk.”59 Similarly, Canada’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making offers a 
detailed four-level matrix of AI impact designed “to help institutions better 
understand and reduce the risks associated with Automated Decision Systems.”60 But 
here, too, leaves much unsaid about the process of determining whether a system will 
have “moderate impacts… that are likely reversible and short-term” as opposed to 
“high-impacts… that can be difficult to reverse, and are ongoing.”61 
The European Commission’s, OECD’s, and Canada’s more detailed processes, 
despite their shortcomings, are the current high-water marks in describing risk 
governance processes for AI; most other frameworks just invoke the terminology as 
though there exists some widely held and commonly understood definition. For 
example, Dubai’s AI ethical standards simply state that “AI operator organisations 
should consider internal risk assessments or ethics frameworks as a means to 
facilitate the identification of risks and mitigating measures.”62 Similarly, the IEEE’s 
Ethically Aligned Design Principles invoke risk management as one of several 
components for effective regulation of AI, without providing more explanation.63 
The Toronto Declaration uses the word “risk” 28 times over 16 pages but does not 
go much further than urging governments and other organizations to identify and 
mitigate the human rights risks from AI.64 And the Personal Data Protection 
Commission of Singapore’s Proposed AI Governance Framework65 does an 
excellent job of identifying several of the ways in which the risks of AI may be 
difficult to measure – for instance noting that “[e]ven within a country, risks may 
vary significantly depending on where AI is deployed.”66 But Singapore’s framework 
offers nothing about how to address those complexities beyond using a “periodically 
reviewed risk impact assessment.”67 
 
 59. OECD, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN SOCIETY 96 (2019). 
 60. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Directive on Automated Decision-Making (2019), 
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592 (last visited May 29, 2020). 
 61. Id. at 8. 
 62. Artificial Intelligence Principles and Ethics, SMART DUBAI, https://smartdubai.ae/initiatives/ai-
principles-ethics (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
 63. See Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and 
Intelligent Systems, IEEE (2019), https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
standards/standards/web/documents/other/ead1e.pdf?utm_medium=undefined&utm_source=undefined&utm_c
ampaign=undefined&utm_content=undefined&utm_term=undefined. 
 64. See Amnesty International & Access Now, Toronto Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and 
non-discrimination in machine learning systems, ACCESS NOW (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/08/The-Toronto-Declaration_ENG_08-2018.pdf. 
 65. Personal Data Protection Commission Singapore, Model Artificial Intelligence Governance Framework 
(2019), https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/files/pdpc/pdf-files/resource-for-
organisation/ai/sgmodelaigovframework2.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 28. 
 67. Id. at 29. 
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A couple of other frameworks also invoke risk while hinting at the deeper 
divisions and complexity that exist in trying to assess risk under conditions of high 
uncertainty. For example, the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial 
Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their Environment invokes the “precautionary 
principle”—one approach to responding to uncertain risks – which hints at the need 
for rules and frameworks to guide risk assessment when those risks cannot be 
adequately measured.68 Similarly, the EU’s High Level Expert Group on AI 
acknowledged that AI systems “may have a negative impact, including impacts 
which may be difficult to anticipate, identify or measure (e.g., on democracy, the rule 
of law and distributive justice, or on the human mind itself…)”69 and urged 
decisionmakers to “[a]dopt adequate measures to mitigate these risks when 
appropriate, and proportionately to the magnitude of the risk.”70 These vague hints 
about the challenges of uncertainty in risk assessments belie the significance and 
difficulty of the choice that lies ahead for AI governance. 
If implemented well, risk governance may be the best approach for unlocking the 
most of AI’s societal benefits, while limiting its potential negative impacts. But in 
order to implement risk governance for AI, we must first understand how risk 
governance can function effectively in areas of great uncertainty. This is an issue that 
some AI governance scholars are already beginning to explore. For instance, Remco 
Zwetsloot and Allan Dafoe acknowledged the challenge of assessing AI’s risks: “But 
any technology as potent as AI will also bring new risks, and it is encouraging that 
many of today’s AI policy initiatives include risk mitigation as part of their mandate. 
Before risks can be mitigated, though, they must first be understood—and we are 
only just beginning to understand the contours of risks from AI.”71  
The vague, almost reflexive, application of risk governance to artificial 
intelligence across numerous AI governance frameworks should give us pause. In 
looking at the frameworks that have invoked concepts of risk, it is clear that most, if 
not all, have given little thought to the question of how risk should be defined and 
measured. This is concerning, because risk governance can be applied in ways that 
favor certainty, but blindly adopting such certainty-centric approaches to risk 
governance ignores important lessons learned over the past decades in other fields. 
 
 68. See Council of Europe, European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial 
Systems and their Environment, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (Dec. 2018), 
https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c (stating that “The use of 
algorithms raises the question of the protection of personal data when being processed. The precautionary 
principle should be applied to risk assessment policies.”). 
 69. INDEPENDENT HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR 
TRUSTWORTHY AI 2 (European Commission eds., 2019). 
 70. Id. at 14. 
 71. Remco Zwetsloot & Allan Dafoe, Thinking About Risks From AI: Accidents, Misuse and Structure, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 11, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thinking-about-risks-ai-accidents-misuse-
and-structure. 
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To understand why, we must first take a brief look at risk governance in these other 
fields. 
III. Risk Governance: Uncertainty in the Natural Sciences 
A. Risk Governance is Not New 
Risk governance may be a new concept within the already short life of AI 
governance, but it is hardly a new concept. As the OECD has noted in its extensive 
report about risk and regulation, the broad process of assessing risk (“asking what 
could happen, and how serious it would be”72) and managing that risk (“asking what 
should be done about it”73) are core and critical parts of human survival and “have 
been undertaken by human beings for millennia.”74 But beyond that broad, survivalist 
formulation of risk governance, the OECD identifies at least a century of more formal 
encapsulations of risk-based regulations in areas like food, drug, and workplace 
safety, finance, and environmental protection.75 
Risk governance plays a particularly important role in technological innovation. 
The International Risk Governance Center (IRGC), an organization focused on risk 
governance and frameworks for managing it, describes how many emerging 
technologies have both significant risks but also opportunities.76 According to the 
IRGC, “the challenge of better risk governance lies in enabling societies to benefit 
from opportunities while minimising the negative consequences of the associated 
risks.”77 For both the OECD and the IRGC, the goal of risk governance is not to 
eliminate risk, because “a posture of zero risk would never have permitted electricity, 
the internal combustion engine, pharmaceuticals, plastics, the Internet or the cell 
phone.”78 Instead, the goal is to find the right balance between benefits and potential 
threats. There are, however, two very different approaches to measuring and, as a 
consequence, balancing risks that cannot be easily measured or quantified. 
 
 72. OECD, RISK AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 136 (2010), 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/risk-and-regulatory-policy_9789264082939-en. 
 73. Id. at 136. 
 74. Id. at 136. 
 75. See id. at 136. 
 76. IRGC, INTRODUCTION TO THE IRGC RISK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 41 (rev. 2017), 
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/233739/files/IRGC.%20%282017%29.%20An%20introduction%20to%20the
%20IRGC%20Risk%20Governance%20Framework.%20Revised%20version..pdf. 
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. OECD, supra note 72, at 239. 
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B. Quantified Approaches to Measuring Risk 
Risk governance—and indeed, most governance as a whole79—is about the 
process of taking things that are uncertain and chaotic and placing them in balance 
to make rational and calculated decisions.80 Accordingly, it should be no surprise that 
one approach to risk governance emphasizes scientific certainty and rigor; the more 
precise we can be in our estimations of risk, costs, and benefits, the greater our 
accuracy can be in weighing those elements.  
As noted earlier, risk governance has two distinct but related elements: (1) the 
process of measuring risk and (2) the process of determining the policy and 
governance responses to that risk.81 The quantified approach to risk governance, 
however, takes that distinction to an extreme, with a risk assessment/risk 
management framework that attempts to cabin qualitative assessments to the policy-
driven risk management process, while making risk assessment an entirely 
quantitative, scientific process.  
This division is intended to protect both the sanctity of the scientific process and 
the normative nature of the political process by partitioning the scientific 
determination of risk (risk assessment) from the political decisionmaking of what to 
do about that risk (risk management).82 This division is itself premised on two closely 
related beliefs. The first belief is that it is possible to scientifically quantify almost 
all risk. This is something the OECD report on risk governance celebrates as an 
achievement in the “decision sciences” because “with the emergence of Bayesian 
statistics and modern decision theory, which treat strength of belief as an indication 
of probability, it is feasible to generate probabilities for uncertain events.”83 The 
 
 79. See, e.g., World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 
WSIS (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (defining Internet governance as 
“the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, 
of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and 
use of the Internet.”). 
 80. See generally What is Risk Governance?, IRGC, https://irgc.org/risk-governance/what-is-risk-
governance/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 81. See, e.g., Ortwin Renn et al., Coping with Complexity, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Risk Governance: 
A Synthesis, 40 AMBIO 231, 232 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357789/; Alberto 
Alemanno, Science & EU Risk Regulation: The Role of Experts in Decision-Making and Judicial Review, in 
CONNEX REPORT SERIES NO. 6 (2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1007401 (last visited Jul 22, 2019) (“If 
one looks at the European risk regulatory framework as it emerges from the general food regulation, this contains 
the following three different components: risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication.”). 
 82. Elizabeth Fisher, Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade Organisation Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism, C. JOERGES & E-U PETERSMANN, CONST., 
MULTI-LEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE, & SOC. REGUL., June 7, 2006, at 3. 
 83. D. John Graham, RISK AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 237–247 
(2010). 
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second underlying belief is that it is possible to separate that scientific quantification 
of risk from non-scientific political and social processes.84 
We can see this division play out in the mid-1990’s EC-Hormones dispute that 
“involved the United States (US) challenging the EU’s ban on beef being sold from 
cattle that had been treated with certain growth hormones”85 under the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).86 The SPS Agreement 
states in part that “Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations.”87 The WTO panel concluded 
this language referred to the stark division between risk assessment and risk 
management, and according to the panel, the issue was whether the EU’s ban had 
properly respected that division.88 
The WTO panel ruled against the ban on the basis that the “division between 
scientific process of risk assessment and a political process of risk management” was 
not respected.89 The panel held that “an assessment of risks is … a scientific 
examination of data and factual studies; it is not a policy exercise involving social 
value judgments made by political bodies.”90 In contrast, “the risk management phase 
involves non-scientific considerations, such as social value judgments.”91 Ultimately 
the WTO panel concluded that the risk management phase must be grounded in the 
scientific determinations made in the risk assessment phase.92 And according to the 
WTO panel, the EU provided no “evidence that the studies it referred to (in so far as 
they can be considered as part of a risk assessment) or the scientific conclusions 
reached therein, have actually been taken into account by the competent EC 
institutions either when it enacted these measures (in 1981 and 1988) or at any later 
point in time.”93 Although the WTO panel decision was subsequently vacated on 
 
 84. Fisher, supra note 82, at 28 (“The division rests upon a presumption that standard-setting can be divided 
into a wholly scientific process of analysing the facts and a political process of applying these facts to the relevant 
normative prescription.”). 
 85. Id. at 25–26. 
 86. Id. at 25. 
 87. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Uruguay 
Round Agreements, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (emphasis added). 
 88. Fisher, supra note 82, at 28.  
 89. Id. at 28. 
 90. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) ¶ 181, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998) (emphasis added). 
 91. Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Complaint by the United 
States ¶ 8.97, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997). 
 92. Id. at 8.113. 
 93. Id. at 8.114. 
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appeal,94 as will be discussed later, it remains a strong example of the quantified 
approach to risk governance. 
Another area where we see a quantitative approach to risk governance is in several 
applications of the precautionary principle. This paper is primarily concerned with 
how we measure risk, not how policymakers respond to that risk once identified. 
Ostensibly, the precautionary principle is about the latter, not the former, offering a 
policy response in the face of uncertain risk. As the European Commission described 
in its 2000 communication intended to “outline the Commission’s approach to using 
the precautionary principle,”95 the Commission noted that following the risk 
assessment phase, the precautionary principle “is essentially used by decision-
makers in the management of risk.”96 That said, in many instances, the precautionary 
principle does relate to how risk is measured, not just what to do about it. 
The complication comes from the fact that several conceptions of the 
precautionary principle assume a quantified measure of risk. It is impossible to speak 
in absolute terms because there is no official, canonical, or clear single definition or 
understanding of the precautionary principle.97 At its most general level, however, 
the precautionary principle is a directive to policymakers to act98 to protect the 
 
 94. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) ¶ WTO Doc. 
WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998). 
 95. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, at 2, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000). 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Gary E. Marchant et al., Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 43, 46 
(“While lawmakers and proponents frequently cite to ‘the’ precautionary principle, there is no standard text for 
the principle, and the dozens of formulations that have been suggested differ in important respects.”); see also 
Daniel A. Farber, Coping with Uncertainty: Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Precautionary Principle, and Climate 
Change, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1659, 1674–75 (2015). 
 98. The appropriate policy response to identifying risk is largely beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
it is worth noting that the policy responses under the precautionary principle are actually quite varied and the 
subject of much debate. For example, in some interpretations, the precautionary principle is “a mandate to halt 
activities . . . regardless of cost.” Farber, supra note 97, at 1674. In other interpretations, the precautionary 
principle is not an automatic bar on the use of technology, but creates a presumption of such a prohibition. Id. 
And in yet another interpretation of the precautionary principle, it requires that policy makers engage in a cost-
benefit analysis. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT para. 15 (1992), 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF
.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf (“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”). Whereas other interpretations actually view precautionary approaches in opposition to a cost-
benefit analysis. See Farber, supra note 97, at 1661 (“Two rival approaches for dealing with this problem are on 
the table: the precautionary principle (which is favored by most environmentalists) and the cost-benefit analysis 
(which is favored by most economists).”). Although there are many competing interpretations, the precautionary 
principle is most associated with prohibitions on new technologies in part due to high profile applications of the 
precautionary principle to restrict development such as genetically modified crops in Europe. Marchant et al., 
supra note 97, at 45–6 (describing the precautionary principle as directing “decision makers to err on the side of 
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wellbeing of their citizens, “without waiting until all the necessary scientific 
knowledge is available.”99 The explicit connection between scientific measures of 
risk and the precautionary principle is one that is repeated across numerous 
interpretations of the precautionary principle.100 The precautionary principle, at least 
in many formulations, serves as yet another example of a quantified approach to 
measuring risk, focusing only on those risks that can be scientifically determined. 
In response to the observation that AI’s risks are uncertain and may be difficult to 
determine, some AI governance scholars, such as Maciej Kuziemski, have offered 
up the precautionary principle as a ready-made solution for addressing that 
challenge.101 But as the above indicates, the precautionary principle is at best an 
incomplete answer. Just as there are formulations of the precautionary principle that 
advocate for a quantified approach, there are also formulations of the precautionary 
principle that advocate for more expansive definitions of risk.102 Thus, the 
precautionary principle cannot in and of itself be an answer when faced with 
uncertain risk, because it begs the question of how we choose to define and measure 
that risk in the first place. 
 
safety by delaying new technologies until their safety can be adequately ensured”); Theresa Papademetriou, 
Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (March 2014), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/eu.php; SCIENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, The 
Precautionary Principle: Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, Future Brief 18 (2017), at 14. 
 99. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 95, at 7. 
 100. Id. (explaining that “[w]hether or not to invoke the Precautionary Principle is a decision exercised where 
scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain . . . .”); United Nations General Assembly, supra 
note 98 (“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”); Marchant et 
al., supra note 97, at 46 (describing application of the precautionary principle in a quantified approach until 
“safety can be adequately ensured”). 
 101. Maciej Kuziemski, A Precautionary Approach to Artificial Intelligence, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 1, 
2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/precautionary-principle-for-artificial-intelligence-by-
maciej-kuziemski-2018-05 (“Even without reliable data, decisionmakers must move forward with AI 
governance. And, as the world waits for scientific certainty (which may never arrive), there is an existing solution 
that can guide us into the unknown: the ‘precautionary principle.’”). 
 102. See Farber, supra note 97, at 1671 (“In its most general sense, the precautionary principle advises that 
lack of certainty is not a justification for inaction in the face of possible risks.”); Alexia Herwig, The 
Precautionary Principle in Support of Practical Reason: An Argument Against Formalistic Interpretations of the 
Precautionary Principle, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 301, 303 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006) (“I submit that the 
precautionary principle is best interpreted as a prohibition, namely, on the use of the lack of scientific 
confirmation as the sole justification for deciding not to act[] . . . As such, the precautionary principle invites 
decision-makers to search for alternative and better grounds for justifying regulatory responses to hazards.”); 
Katie Steele, The Precautionary Principle: A New Approach to Public Decision-Making, 5 LAW, PROB. & RISK 
19, 25 (2006). See also OECD’s risk governance framework, OECD, supra note 72, at 16–17, which is decidedly 
critical of the precautionary principle and states that “[w]here the probability of harm cannot be calculated, a 
risk-based approach would require a rational and transparent consideration of other relevant factors that for want 
of evidence remain uncertain.” 
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1. Issues with the Quantified Approach to Risk 
The quantified approach to risk is premised on two beliefs: (1) that almost all risk 
can be scientifically measured and evaluated; and (2) that the quantitative aspects of 
risk can be completely separated from social and political constructs. Both of those 
beliefs have come under fire from scholars of risk governance.  
a. Not everything can be calculated:  
Although the OECD may be correct that decision sciences have come a long way 
in their ability to assign quantifiable risk to a myriad of uncertain things,103 the world 
simply remains too complex to properly quantify many risks, particularly those of 
rapidly evolving, emerging technologies. This is not a new revelation. In 1999, the 
European Science and Technology Observatory published a series of case studies 
looking at the management of technological risk across a range of scientific fields.104 
As part of their analysis of those cases, they concluded that “the imponderables 
associated with global climate models, the sheer number of chemicals and the 
unpredictability of their behaviour in the environment and the unprecedented nature 
of genetic modification technology are all such as to render ignorance and 
uncertainty (in their formal senses) the dominant conditions in the management of 
each of these types of risk.”105 Moreover, the European Commission’s 
communication on the precautionary principle acknowledges that there are some 
risks that “cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined 
because of the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data.”106 
One of the foremost scholars of risk governance, Ortwin Renn, and his co-authors, 
go even further. In what is seemingly a direct response to the OECD’s celebration of 
Bayesian analysis, they stated “that in situations of uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity, risks cannot be treated just in terms of likelihood (probability) and 
(quantifiable) effects… Therefore, risk evaluation is by definition multi-
dimensional.”107 Renn and his co-authors go even further, asserting that there is a 
“convincing, theoretically demanding, and empirically sound basis to argue that 
many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and effects alone, and that 
regulatory models which build on that assumption are not just inadequate, but 
constitute an obstacle to responsibly dealing with risk.”108 
 
 103. Graham, supra note 83, at 237–42. 
 104. ANDREW STIRLING, EUROPEAN COMMISSION JOINT RESEARCH COMMITTEE, ON SCIENCE AND 
PRECAUTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL RISK: VOLUME I – A SYNTHESIS REPORT OF CASE 
STUDIES (May 1999). 
 105. Id. at 18. 
 106. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 95, at 13. 
 107. Renn et al., supra note 81, at 239–40. 
 108. Id. at 233. 
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Other critics of the quantification of risk have observed that the belief in the 
certainty of science to provide clear assessments of risk is more of a problem for 
lawyers and policymakers than it is for scientists. At least one critic has suggested, 
for example, that scientific peer review instead of judicial review would be more 
useful for risk analysis because judges and lawyers continually fail to see what 
scientists know all too well: that “uncertainty is inherent in science and that in many 
cases, scientific studies do not produce conclusive evidence.”109 
To some, it may seem almost laughably self-obvious to say that the complexity of 
the world in general—and emerging technologies in particular—defy efforts to 
quantify its risks. And yet, as the previous section has discussed, the belief that all 
risks can be quantified remains a powerful force in the risk governance debate. And 
as we look ahead to risk governance of AI, we see how such a belief may also hold 
sway in a Silicon Valley culture that has long celebrated the power of quantification 
in all forms.110  
b. Risk is a societal and political concept 
The second key belief underpinning quantified approaches to risk is that it is 
possible to separate the scientific assessment of a risk from the political and social 
context in which that risk occurs. But here too, the view of risk assessment as simply 
“a summarization of scientific understanding”111 has been assailed by critics like 
Hannot Rodríguez, who has studied risk governance of nanotechnology and 
concluded that “the way in which risk is approached cannot be split from broader 
conceptions regarding society.”112 Similarly, Alberto Alemanno has observed that 
the divide between risk assessment and risk management, “which has found both 
institutional and normative expression in the general food law regulation, fails short 
[sic] to normatively recognize the value judgments implicit in the first stage of risk 
analysis.”113 
These critics believe that risk assessment is not a sterile, clinical decision rooted 
solely in cold, scientific analysis. The very act of assessing risk is itself a political 
process. For example, in the context of assessing the risk of climate change, to what 
extent should US policymakers consider the risks to those outside the United 
 
 109. Alemanno, supra note 81, at 25. 
 110. See, e.g., Sarah Todd, “There’s a deep sadness to it”: A new book takes on masculinity in Silicon Valley, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 11, 2020), https://qz.com/work/1800471/uncanny-valley-author-anna-wiener-on-silicon-valleys-
sexism/. 
 111. COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATON, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING 
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 14 (National Academy Press 1996). 
 112. Hannot Rodríguez, Nanotechnology and Risk Governance in the European Union: the Constitution of 
Safety in Highly Promoted and Contested Innovation Areas, 12 NANOETHICS 5, 15 (2018). 
 113. Alemanno, supra note 81, at 11. 
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States?114 As Daniel Faber points out, the decision about how to assess the value of 
foreign lives might very well be a political decision, but it may significantly impact 
the risk assessment.115 Similarly, with respect to nanotechnology, experts have 
attempted to address the technology’s safety “with a one-dimensional ‘appropriate 
knowledge and science-based’ answer,” but determining the relevant science or 
defining “dangerous” are themselves contested issues “that cannot be determined by 
disregarding broad considerations concerning society in terms of the way in which 
technological innovations, the economy and public values should be prioritized and 
related to each other.”116 Many risk governance experts are therefore skeptical that 
science alone can provide a fair measure of risk. 
This same skepticism is also apparent in the ultimate resolution of the EC-
Hormones case discussed earlier.117 Following the WTO panel ruling, the parties 
appealed, and the appellate panel agreed that the European Communities’ ban was 
improper, but disagreed with the original panel’s rationale.118 Although the appellate 
body’s decision was based upon many factors, one aspect was the conclusion that the 
“risk assessment” described in the SPS Agreement did not “exclude a priori, from 
the scope of a risk assessment, factors which are not susceptible of quantitative 
analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly associated 
with the physical sciences.”119 For the Appellate Body, it was important that risk 
assessment include “not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory… but also 
risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for 
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and 
die.”120 As administrative law and risk governance expert Elizabeth Fisher has 
described, “[i]mplicit in the Appellate Body’s approach is an appreciation of the 
complexities in assessing risk and the problems of scientific uncertainty.”121 
But as we look ahead to risk governance of AI, we again see a troubling parallel. 
Just as quantitative approaches to risk assume that measuring risk can be done 
entirely apart from the messier and political social constructs in which that risk exists, 
 
 114. See Farber, supra note 97, at 1718. 
 115. Id. (evaluating Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner’s critiques of the Interagency Working Group  
(IWG) on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases). 
 116. Rodríguez, supra note 112, at 16. 
 117. See supra notes 82 and 94 and accompanying text. 
 118. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) ¶ WTO Doc. 
WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998). 
 119. Id. at 253(j). It is important to acknowledge that the Appellate Body was engaged in the process of 
textual interpretation, trying to understand what “risk assessment” meant in the context of the SPS Agreement, 
not develop an overarching definition. However, it is nonetheless telling that in the absence of much textual 
guidance from the treaty, the WTO panel and appellate body reflect the contours of the general debate about the 
extent to which “risk assessment” can include non-scientific, quantifiable measure of risk. Id. at 253(j)–(k). 
 120. Id. at 187. 
 121. Fisher, supra note 82, at 343. 
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we also see AI systems designed and developed apart from the real-world contexts 
in which they will operate.122 Particularly in areas like algorithmic risk assessment 
tools in the criminal justice system, there is a tendency to view algorithmically 
generated risk scores as an abstract truth revealed through data, technology, and 
science, instead of viewing them as the social constructs they are.123  
C. Qualitative Approaches to Measuring Risk 
The quantitative approach to risk, however, is not the only option. Risk 
governance experts and scholars, working in a range of different scientific fields and 
disciplines have developed alternative approaches that continue to value scientific 
data, but do so alongside other more qualitative measures of risk. Unlike the 
quantitative approaches, these more expansive definitions of risk embrace data and 
methodologies that are inherently messy, uncertain, and ambiguous.  
Evaluating the risk of new technologies is particularly challenging for any risk 
governance framework that emphasizes scientific certainty and simple 
quantification. First, even as new technologies move from research labs and 
prototypes to commercial and consumer applications, the pace of technological 
developments often remains rapid.124 Second, in part because of the rapid pace of 
technological change, we often lack the tools and methodologies for fully measuring 
and assessing the risks of new technologies.125 Third, new technologies quickly 
become diffuse in their applications, meaning that neither the technology nor its risks 
are monolithic in nature.126 And finally, the impacts of new technologies are rarely 
 
 122. Amar Ashar & Sandra Cortesi, Why Inclusion Matters for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/why-inclusion-matters-for-the-future-of-artificial-
intelligence-2cb9d3b1b92b. 
 123. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 23. 
 124. See Marchant et al., supra note 97, at 44 (“Another complication is the rapid pace of nanotechnology 
development, which is rapidly outpacing the development of risk assessment for these technologies.”). 
 125. See id. at 43–44 (“[T]he difficulties in identifying, nevermind quantifying, the health, safety, and 
environmental risks of nanotechnology are a major impediment to applying traditional risk management 
approaches to nanotechnology . . . . Current understanding of nanotechnology risks is too uncertain to permit 
meaningful risk assessment, and is likely to remain so for some time. There are no accepted test methods or 
validated data that can be used to prepare scientifically credible quantitative estimates of risk specific 
nanotechnology applications at this time.”); see also Governenace of Emerging Risks, IRGC, https://irgc.org/risk-
governance/emerging-risk/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2021) (“Emerging risks are issues that are perceived to be 
potentially significant but which may not be fully understood and assessed, thus not allowing risk management 
options to be developed with confidence.”). 
 126. See STIRLING, supra note 104, at 9 (“Technological risk is not a single monolithic quantity. Even under 
the most reductive of analytical approaches, it is conceded that risk is a function of two variables – the probability 
of an impact and it’s [sic] magnitude. However, it is only very rarely the case that an individual technology is 
seen to present only one form of hazard.”); id. at 5 (“The novelty of the technologies and the diffuse, diverse and 
dynamic contexts for their application render such concerns extremely difficult to verify or falsify in advance of 
their manifestation.”). 
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uniform across all populations and geographies.127 For these four reasons, new 
technologies resist efforts at quantifying their risks.128 
These lessons about the challenges of quantifying and assessing the risks of new 
technologies have been learned in fields like nanotechnology over a decade ago, and 
remain just as true for new technologies like artificial intelligence. Indeed, in a 2008 
article on risk management for nanotechnology, Gary Marchant, Douglas Sylvester, 
and Kenneth Abbott, wrote that “the difficulties in identifying, never mind 
quantifying, the health, safety, and environmental risks of nanotechnology are a 
major impediment to applying traditional risk management approaches to 
nanotechnology. Risk management of nanotechnology is further challenged by the 
broad range of technologies and products encompassed within the term 
‘nanotechnology’….”129 And one could simply replace the word “nanotechnology” 
with “artificial intelligence” and it would be equally true today.130  
New technologies, from genetic engineering, to nanotechnologies, to AI, often 
resist efforts to quantify the risks, and yet risks remain. If quantitative approaches 
falter, how then can policymakers respond appropriately to those risks? More 
expansive risk governance frameworks that embrace uncertainty have three key 
features: (1) they focus on broadening participation in the risk governance process, 
including a range of key stakeholders; (2) they value qualitative data and policy 
analysis; and (3) they use deliberative, multistakeholder processes. We will now look 
at each of these in turn. 
1. Broadening Participation 
Quantitative approaches to risk governance, by focusing on scientific certainty, 
consequently limit the conversation to a narrow set of experts and perspectives —
namely scientific experts and researchers who offer quantified measurements of 
risk.131 But responding to the unique challenges of emerging technologies requires 
 
 127. See OECD, supra note 72, at 245 (“Sometimes the challenge of risk management arises because a new 
technology poses risks for one group of citizens yet benefits others. Nanotechnology may assist in the production 
of new medicines for patients and new batteries for plug-in hybrid cars. Yet nanotechnology may also pose health 
risks for workers or even unexpected risks to ecosystems.”). 
 128. Moreover, new technologies often emerge because they hold tremendous promise for new societal 
benefits. The focus on risk of new technologies can also undervalue these potential benefits, which can be as 
difficult to measure as the risks themselves. See Marchant et al., supra note 97, at 45 (“[B]y only considering 
risks and their acceptability, they disregard other important factors such as the benefits of the technology creating 
the risks and the costs of reducing risks.”). 
 129. Id. at 43. 
 130. See Pei Wang, On Defining Artificial Intelligence, 10 J. OF ARTIFICIAL GEN. INTEL., no. 2 (2019) 
(explaining the challenge of defining and measuring the risk of AI). 
 131. Fisher, supra note 82, at 340–41. 
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working with a broader set of stakeholders, both to better understand the risks and to 
ultimately manage them.132  
Including stakeholders in both ways—defining risk and developing responses—
is important. For example, including diverse stakeholders in defining the risk allows 
responses to be crafted that “respond to pressing non-scientific normative concerns 
in ways that will be accepted as deserving recognition by those affected by a 
decision.”133 In other words, if diverse stakeholders are excluded from the process of 
identifying and assessing the risks in the first place, risks will be missed, and no 
matter the interventions that are ultimately developed, it will be difficult for any 
intervention to be responsive and ultimately accepted.134 
Similarly, the participation of diverse stakeholders is important in responding to 
those risks. As the IRGC has explained, “[s]ystemic risks are embedded in the larger 
context of societal, financial and economic change. Such risks cannot be managed 
through the actions of a single sector, but require the involvement of different 
stakeholders, including governments, industry, academia, and members of civil 
society.”135 Because the risks are diffuse across so many elements of society, any 
comprehensive response requires the involvement, engagement, and support of a 
similarly diverse cross section of stakeholders. 
Elements of this emphasis on broadening participation are apparent in the 
European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program.136 One pillar of the program is the 
Responsible Research and Innovation Framework (RRI).137 Central to the RRI is the 
belief that “[t]he grand societal challenges that lie before us will have a far better 
chance of being tackled if all societal actors are fully engaged in the co-construction 
 
 132. Although this paper is primarily focused on how we define and measure risk, many of the more 
qualitative frameworks address both the assessment of risk and how to manage it. See, e.g., Renn et al., supra 
note 81. As described previously, quantitative approaches tend to emphasize a stark distinction between the 
process of assessing risk and responding to it, in party as a way of separating the scientific from the political. See 
supra Part III. B. As is described below, more qualitative approaches reflect the belief that risk assessment and 
political contexts cannot and should not be separated, and thus also dispense with the need to formally separate 
the assessment of risk from the policy response. See infra Part III.C.2. In fact, several qualitative approaches 
view the process of developing effective response as an ongoing feedback loop that continuously moves between 
assessment and response. See, e.g., Renn, et al., supra note 81, at 238, Figure 3; IRGC, supra note 76, at 12, 
Figure 2. 
 133. Herwig, supra note 102, at 304 (discussing the importance of expanded participation in an expansive 
interpretation of the precautionary principle). 
 134. See also STIRLING, supra note 104, at 2 (“The appraisal of technological risks should therefore be 
conducted in an open and pluralistic fashion, allowing for critical discourse as an essential part not only of the 
regulatory process, but of the appraisal of the technological options themselves.”). 
 135. IRGC, supra note 76. 
 136. Horizon 2020 – Work Programme 2018-2020 (Jun. 17, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-leit-ict_en.pdf. 
 137. Horizon 2020 – Work Programme 2018-2020: 16. Science with and for Society, at 8-9 (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-swfs_en.pdf. 
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of innovative solutions, products and services. Responsible research and innovation 
means that societal actors work together during the whole research and innovation 
process in order to better align both the process and its outcomes, with the values, 
needs and expectations of European society.”138 Similarly, Renn, Klinke, and van 
Asselt propose a framework called “precaution-based risk management” that 
emphasizes “a reflective processing involving stakeholders … necessary to ponder 
concerns, economic budgeting and social evaluations.”139  
Including diverse stakeholders within a risk governance framework is no simple 
matter. Diverse stakeholders have diverse opinions, which can lead to disagreements 
and delay.140 And just identifying the correct stakeholders and ensuring they can 
adequately participate creates significant procedural hurdles.141 That added 
complexity and challenge may be why even the RRI and precaution-based risk 
management frameworks continue to place greater emphasis on involving 
stakeholders in responding to identified risks than in identifying and assessing the 
risks in the first place.142 Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that involving 
diverse stakeholders is not only important for addressing the challenges of emerging 
technologies, but also complex, unpredictable, and inherently messy. 
2. Qualitative and Policy Analysis 
Emerging technologies create real risks that require real responses, but as 
described above, the risks of emerging technologies also resist quantification and 
scientific certainty.143 Quantitative approaches to risk operate on the assumption that 
“quantitative techniques, either of statistics or of modeling, would suffice for the 
guidance of risk policy and risk management.”144 But as the European Science and 
Technology Office observed over 20 years ago, “it became clear that while science 
is an essential core of the assessment process, it could not be the whole.”145 
 
 138. DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR RSCH. AND INNOVATION & EUROPEAN COMM’N, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION: EUROPE’S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO SOCIETAL CHALLENGES 2 (2014), 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:KI0214595:EN:HTML. 
 139. Renn et al., supra note 81, at 241. 
 140. Urs Gasser, Ryan Budish & Sarah Myers West, Multistakeholder as Governance Groups: Observations 
from Case Studies, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2014/internet_governance. 
 141. See generally id. (exploring the difficulties of properly engaging diverse stakeholders across an array of 
governance processes). 
 142. See, e.g., Rodríguez, supra note 112, at 19 (criticizing RRI for the fact that its “inclusiveness has been 
concerned with how to appraise an allegedly objective risk inclusively in the risk management process, 
‘understood as a process of weighing the outcome of the risk assessment with political and socio-economic 
factors.’”). 
 143. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 144. STIRLING, supra note 104, at Preface. 
 145. Id. 
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Although the quantitative approaches to risk governance tend to emphasize 
quantitative measures at the exclusion of all others, it need not be so. Writing for the 
National Research Council in 1996, Paul Stern and Harvey Fineberg asserted that 
“[r]isk analysis can be qualitative as well as quantitative,” and indeed must be where 
“for some important elements of risk, no valid method of quantification is 
available.”146 In seeking to respond to the challenges of emerging technologies, 
science and quantified measures of risk remain important, but must be one part of a 
risk governance framework, not the only part.147 
Quantitative approaches to risk governance attempt to distill risk down to a “a 
one-dimensional quantitative expression of technological risk.”148 By contrast, 
qualitative approaches must instead simultaneously consider multiple dimensions 
and values,149 including an exploration of how and why those values may diverge.150 
As Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt cogently argue, this qualitative assessment must be 
contextually grounded in cultural values, which ultimately shape everything from 
conceptions of justice, to morality and ethics.151 As they go onto say, “the selection 
of strategies for risk handling is therefore understandable only within the context of 
broader world views. Hence society can never derive acceptability or tolerability 
from looking at the evidence alone.”152 
Taking two steps back, we see that more qualitative approaches to risk governance 
need to be able to absorb, process, and respond to a multitude of divergent social and 
cultural values, and interpret it within a broader context. In fact, we already have a 
model for how to do just that: mutlistakeholder governance systems.153 Indeed, 
across more qualitative risk governance frameworks, we see the acknowledgement 
that risk governance is less a sterile scientific endeavor and more a messy political 
one. As Stern and Fineberg wrote: 
 
 146. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 97. 
 147. See STIRLING, supra note 104, at 20 (“Science can only ever provide one part of the basis for the 
regulation of technological risk. Science is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for effective risk 
management.”). 
 148. Id. at 16. 
 149. Renn et al., supra note 81, at 240 (“In sum, risk evaluation involves the deliberative effort to qualify 
risks in terms of acceptability and tolerability in a situation of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity, which 
implies that neither the risks nor the benefits can be clearly identified. Multiple dimensions and multiple values 
have to be considered.”). 
 150. See STIRLING, supra note 104, at 16 (“The appraisal of technological risk is evidently as much about 
systematic qualitative exploration of the consequences of divergent social values as it is about precise numerical 
characterisations of the physical impacts of the technologies themselves. It is better to be roughly accurate in this 
task of mapping the social and methodological context-dependencies. than it is to be precisely wrong in spurious 
aspirations to a one-dimensional quantitative expression of technological risk.”). 
 151. Renn et al., supra note 81, at 240. 
 152. Id. 
 153. GASSER, BUDISH, & WEST, supra note 140. 
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Risk decisions are, ultimately, public policy choices. In principle, analysis 
of a set of alternative decisions could show which would produce the 
fewest deaths, the fewest new cancers, the fewest workdays lost to illness, 
or the least cost to a manufacturer under given circumstances, but it 
cannot tell how these different effects should be weighed in the context of 
the decision. No amount of analysis can determine whether cancer-
incidence rates should be more important to society than the number of 
workdays lost, or whether preventing cancer should be more important 
than preventing reproductive disorders or, whether reducing the 
prevalence of environmental illness in a broad population should be more 
important than ensuring an equitable distribution of the risk across 
subpopulations or a reduction of risk to a particular subpopulation (e.g., 
children, the elderly).154 
Quantitative approaches to risk generally agree that risk governance is in part 
political; cleaving risk assessment from risk management was an attempt to cordon 
off the scientific (risk assessment) from the political (risk management). As the 
European Commission’s communication on the precautionary principle stated, 
“[d]ecision-makers need to be aware of the degree of uncertainty attached to the 
results of the evaluation of the available scientific information. Judging what is an 
‘acceptable’ level of risk for society is an eminently political responsibility.”155 The 
difference, however, is that qualitative approaches believe that the assessment of risk 
itself involves political, social, and ethical judgments, rejecting the belief that 
assessment of risk is itself apolitical.156 Viewed from that perspective, the entirety of 
the risk governance process becomes an eminently political responsibility.  
3. Creating Deliberative Processes 
The final feature of more qualitative risk governance frameworks is the creation 
and use of deliberative processes, which is the natural consequence of the first two 
features. Successfully having diverse stakeholders consider qualitative and 
quantitative measures of risk in a public, policy-oriented fashion necessitates the use 
of a deliberative, participatory process.157 But similar to what we have observed with 
other emerging technologies—like the Internet—the creation of effective, legitimate, 
 
 154. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 26. 
 155. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 95, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 156. See IRGC, supra note 76, at 2 (noting that risk assessment “goes beyond conventional scientific risk 
assessment” to also include stakeholder opinions and perceptions). 
 157. See generally IRGC, supra note 76 (explaining the IRGC’s framework for risk governance). 
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multistakeholder processes requires significant care in the design and operation of 
the system.158 
As a first step, such processes require the “appropriately diverse participation or 
representation of the spectrum of interested and affected parties, of decision makers, 
and of specialists in risk analysis, at each step.”159 But engaging diverse stakeholders 
requires more than simply bringing people to a room; as we have observed in various 
multistakeholder groups, inclusion of diverse stakeholders works “only if 
participants and stakeholders have the ability and resources to take advantage of 
those opportunities for participation.”160 The same is true for participation in risk 
governance processes. Thus, inclusive risk governance processes need to take steps 
to facilitate effective and meaningful participation from stakeholders.161 This may 
include providing educational training, support for navigating regulatory and 
bureaucratic processes, technical assistance, and more.162 Without these support 
structures in place, stakeholders will find it difficult to navigate an already complex 
process.163 
In addition to building these support structures, more expansive risk governance 
frameworks also need an iterative process designed to help channel the efforts of 
stakeholders toward the ultimate goal of identifying and mitigating the risks of 
emerging technologies. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate all 
of the possible deliberative frameworks, there exist several.164 (see, for example, 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 below). Although implementation details vary, at their highest 
levels, these frameworks provide a process through which participants can identify 
the problem, evaluate both qualitative and quantitative measures of risk, consider 
societal values and norms with respect to those risks, identify and select mitigation 
strategies, and implement those strategies.165 Although such a process may be slow, 
 
 158. See generally GASSER, BUDISH, & WEST, supra note 140 (exploring existing multistakeholder 
governance groups with the goal of informing the future evolution of the Internet governance ecosystem). 
 159. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 3; see also Renn et al., supra note 81, at 241 (“This 
requires a demanding participative process, involving stakeholders as well as the affected public[s].”). 
 160. GASSER, BUDISH & WEST, supra note 140, at 20–21. 
 161. Renn et al., supra note 81, at 242 (“The key challenge is to facilitate that various actors from different 
backgrounds succeed in interacting meaningfully in the face of uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity.”). 
 162. See NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 4; see also Renn et al., supra note 81, at 242. 
 163. See, e.g., GASSER, BUDISH & WEST, supra note 140, at 21 (discussing how knowledge and resource gaps 
limited effective participation from certain stakeholders and reinforced preexisting power imbalances). 
 164. See, e.g., Renn, et al., supra note 81, at 238, Figure 3; IRGC, supra note 76, at 12, Figure 2. 
 165. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 3 (“Success also depends on deliberations that formulate 
the decision problem, guide analysis to improve decision participants’ understanding, seek the meaning of the 
analytic findings and uncertainties, and improve the ability of interested and affected parties to participate 
effectively in the risk decision process.”). 
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unpredictable, and inconsistent, the ultimate aim is to conclude with binding 
outcomes that all participants accept as legitimate.166 
4. Issues with Qualitative Approach to Risk 
A scientific, quantified approach to measuring risk holds the promise of 
consistent, worldwide standards grounded in objective criteria.167 Risk 
measurements based on scientific, objective standards can be repeatable and 
consistent around the world.168 A quantified measure of safety of genetically 
modified crops or of hormones in beef does not vary by geography or political 
whims, whereas more qualitative and subjective approaches can lead to a 
balkanization of standards.169 Even when acting in good faith, different countries or 
regions can reach very different measures of risk when including more qualitative 
factors, which—for better or worse—can make it impossible to have broadly 
applicable standards for emerging technologies.  
Perhaps more concerning, the qualitative measures of risk also create a risk of 
abuse from policymakers not acting in good faith. This was a concern evident in the 
EC-Hormones case, where there was a fear that more subjective standards of “risk” 
and “safety” could allow for political, social, and economic factors to unduly 
influence the results.170 And in the process, it can become difficult to distinguish true 
qualitative risk factors from those being used as a fig leaf to cover less noble 
objectives, such as protectionist trade policies.171  
Qualitative approaches to risk rely on diverse stakeholders working through 
deliberative processes, seeking to understand risk through the lens of cultural and 
political norms, and conceptions of fairness, justice, ethics, and morality.172 This 
adds complication, delay, unpredictability, ambiguity, and messiness.173 But perhaps 
even more challenging is that it introduces risks of subjectivity and opacity.174 And 
 
 166. See Renn et al., supra note 81, at 241. 
 167. OECD, supra note 72, at 103 (emphasizing how quantitative risk governance provides consistency in 
decision making processes). 
 168. Id. at 103–104. 
 169. Fisher, supra note 82, at 344 (noting the WTO Panel’s decision may have been motivated by a desire to 
have consistent international standards). 
 170. Alemanno, supra note 81, at 9 (“The EC ban turned out to be motivated by a complex mix of political, 
social, economic and  conflicting scientific factors that, as we have seen, may now formally enter into the EC 
food  decision-making process directed at the adoption of safety measures.”). 
 171. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 95, at 8 (expressing concern about the 
potential for the precautionary principle to be used as a “justification for disguised protectionism.”). 
 172. IRGC, supra note 76. 
 173. See Renn et al., supra note 81, at 242; See also GASSER, BUDISH, & WEST, supra note 130. 
 174. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
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it is this subjectivity, opacity, messiness, and unpredictability that many are keen to 
avoid.175 
But proponents of qualitative approaches accept those costs because they view 
measuring risk—particularly the risks of highly uncertain emerging technologies—
as a value-laden exercise that requires the input from experts and stakeholders 
alike.176 Moreover, they view it as necessary for emerging technologies like AI 
because “[t]here can be no simple analytical, instrumental or institutional ‘fixes’ for 
the complexities encountered in the management of technological risks.”177 
Nonetheless, it stands in stark contrast to the quantitative approaches that emphasize 
scientific certainty and quantification in an “attempt to reduce many dimensions of 
risk to one as an aid to decision-making.”178 
There is no single understanding of how to measure risk and no single framework 
for risk governance. Instead, across numerous scientific fields, there have emerged 
some clear choices. On one side are approaches that favor scientific certainty and 
quantification, that strive to offer consistency, clarity, and transparency in their 
results. On the other side are approaches that include more expansive, inclusive, and 
qualitative understandings of risk, but at the potential cost of uncertainty, 
unpredictability, inconsistency, and messiness. It is this choice between approaches 
that AI governance needs to make. 
IV. The Pull Toward Certainty: Law, Ethics, and Human Rights  
A. Frameworks for AI 
Risk governance scholars looking at emerging technology in fields like 
nanotechnology, biology, environmental science and others—areas where the 
quantification of risk is particularly elusive—have increasingly advocated for more 
qualitative measures of risk.179 But quantified approaches to risk have a strong 
appeal, offering greater certainty and predictability.180 As risk governance is 
increasingly invoked as the cornerstone of AI governance frameworks—often with 
 
 175. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 72, at 94 (“Such uncertainty is too important to be treated in a purely 
intuitive and qualitative way; rather, it should be expressed in terms of numerical probabilities. These probability 
estimates are necessarily subjective, but they are explicit, hence open to scrutiny by third parties, and can be 
revised in a logically consistent way when new information becomes available.”). 
 176. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 11 (“[R]isk characterization involves complex, value-
laden judgments and a need for effective dialogue between technical experts and interested and affected citizens 
who may lack technical expertise, yet have essential information and often hold strong views and substantial 
power in our democratic society.”). 
 177. STIRLING, supra note 104, at 2. 
 178. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 111, at 5. 
 179. See supra Part III.C. 
 180. See supra Part III.C.4. 
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little by way of guidance or explanation181—it is critical to ask, which direction will 
AI governance go? Unfortunately, there is reason for concern that AI developers and 
policymakers will gravitate toward certainty and quantification. 
In his seminal history of risk, Peter Bernstein warned that  
“[n]othing is more soothing or more persuasive than the computer 
screen, with its imposing arrays of numbers, glowing colors, and 
elegantly structured graphs. As we stare at the passing show, we become 
so absorbed that we tend to forget that the computer only answers 
questions; it does not ask them. Whenever we ignore that truth, the 
computer supports us in our conceptual errors. Those who live only by 
the numbers may find that the computer has simply replaced the oracles 
to whom people resorted in ancient times for guidance in risk 
management and decision-making.”182  
As Bernstein eloquently described, computers operate in the realm of the certain; 
deterministically pushing 1s and 0s across silicon chips. But it is humans who write 
the code, select the training data, and are ultimately responsible for the creation of 
AI systems.183 It is humans who write and enforce the laws that apply to the use of 
such systems.184 And it is humans who are ultimately affected, for better and worse, 
by the use of such systems.185 And it is at that boundary—where uncertain and 
ambiguous human thoughts, needs, and limitations are translated into the certainty 
of algorithms and code—that we see the pull toward certainty. 
We see this inherent pull toward certainty in areas where AI must grapple with 
complex concepts like fairness. In 2018, Computer Science professor Arvind 
Naraynan gave a tutorial at the Fairness Accountability and Transparency for AI and 
Machine Learning (“FAT*”) conference entitled 21 Definition of Fairness and Their 
Politics.186 In that lecture, he identified 21 different (and mutually exclusive) 
mathematical models of fairness.187 Naraynan’s point was not that there should be 
only one definition, but that it is common for computer scientists and programmers 
to believe that there should be only one.188 Why? For computer scientists and 
 
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK, at 336 (1998). 
 183. See Kate Crawford, Opinion | Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html. 
 184. Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-
algorithms.html. 
 185. OECD, supra note 31, at 3 (describing the potential benefits and harms from AI technologies on people). 
 186. Narayanan, supra note 15. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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programmers, ambiguity is often incompatible with the necessities of code.189 “Fair” 
is an inherently ambiguous term, but that semantic ambiguity translates poorly to 
computer code.190 Ultimately, the programmer seeks certainty about which of those 
21 models they should choose.191 And computer scientists and programmers are not 
the only ones who may desire certainty. Policymakers may also seek certainty as they 
try to create bright lines rules that can be easily followed by both the programmers 
who must make decisions expressed in math and logic, and the judges and regulators 
who must apply law to evaluate those decisions.192 Similarly, as computer scientists, 
programmers, policymakers, and others seek to develop AI governance frameworks 
that can be operationalized, they may also be pulled toward quantification and 
certainty. 
In many ways, the AI governance debate over the last few years can be seen as a 
search for certainty that has, for the moment at least, culminated in the adoption of 
risk governance frameworks. Experts from the fields of law, ethics, and human rights 
have debated with each other as to whose field offers sufficient certainty to guide AI 
governance. Viewed in that light, the recent turn toward risk governance may be 
specifically because the quantified approach offers the illusion of certainty in the 
form of distilling complex, multivariate tradeoffs into a single risk equation in a way 
that legal, ethical, and human rights frameworks do not currently offer. Let us look 
briefly at each one: 
 
• Certainty and the Law: Internet governance expert and legal scholar 
Rolf Weber observed, “[t]he functions of law crystalize in rules and 
institutions that underpin civil society, facilitate orderly interaction and 
resolve disputes and conflicts arising in spite of such rules…. Thereby, 
the rule of law helps to achieve a high degree of certainty and 
predictability of legal norms….”193 Thus, a key function of law is to 
provide certainty. However, the Future of Privacy Forum observed that 
advances in AI technology “have far outpaced the legal and ethical 
frameworks for managing this technology. There is simply no commonly 
agreed upon framework for governing the risks—legal, reputational, 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Liptak, supra note 184, at 1 (describing concerns with integrating algorithmic tools into the justice 
system). 
 193. Rolf H. Weber, Socio-Ethical Values and Legal Rules on Automated Platforms: The Quest for a 
Symbiotic Relationship, in PLATFORM VALUES: CONFLICTING RIGHTS, ARITFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND TAX 
AVOIDANCE, 88 (2019), https://cyberbrics.info/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/special_issue_platform_values_igf_consolidated_.pdf. 
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ethical, and more—associated with ML [machine learning].”194 This is 
apparent in the 160 sets of principles that Algorithm Watch has identified 
in their inventory,195 only a single one is an enforceable law or 
regulation: Canada’s Directive on Automated Decisionmaking.196 Weber 
goes even farther, doubting whether law is even capable of responding 
to the challenges of AI and other complex digital technologies.197 
Moreover, as legal scholars Brent Mittlestadt and Urs Gasser have 
separately observed, even quasi-legal constraints like professional codes 
of conduct are lacking in specific directives around AI governance.198  
 
• Certainty and Ethics: Ethics is a way of formalizing and describing 
standards of right and wrong,199 but there are several different ethical 
frameworks. Dentological ethical frameworks for example, focus on 
concepts like autonomy, dignity, rights, justice, fairness,200 and have 
clearly influenced high-level principles like those from the OECD that 
are organized around those same themes. Operationalizing these 
concepts, however, is a challenge as Vallor, Green, and Raicu wrote: “it 
is important to remember that deontological concerns often need to be 
balanced with other kinds of concerns. For example, autonomy is not an 
unconditional good (you don’t want to empower your users to do 
anything they want). When user autonomy poses unacceptable moral 
 
 194. ANDREW BURT ET AL., Beyond Explainability: A Practical Guide to Managing Risk in Machine Learning 
Models, (Sep. 20, 2019), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Beyond-Explainability.pdf. 
 195. See AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory by AlgorithmWatch, supra note 1, at 1. 
 196. Secretariat, supra note 60, at 1. 
 197. Weber, see supra note 193, at 92 (“On the one hand, the AI era [incl. automated platforms] needs, as 
shown, a broader and more complex consideration of values exceeding a narrow perception of legal rights, and, 
on the other hand, the traditional legal instruments, particularly the multilateral treaties, do not suffice anymore 
to tackle the challenges in the digital world.”). 
 198. See Brent Mittelstadt, Principles Alone Cannot Guarantee Ethical AI, 1 NAT MACH INTELL 501–507 
(2019) (“AI development lacks [1] common aims and fiduciary duties, [2] professional history and norms, [3] 
proven methods to translate principles into practice, and [4] robust legal and professional accountability 
mechanisms.”); Urs Gasser & Carolyn Schmitt, The Role of Pro. Norms in the Governance of Artificial 
Intelligence, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3378267. 
199 .  Manuel Velasquez et al., What is Ethics?, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS AT SANTA CLARA 
UNIV., https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/what-is-ethics/ (last visited May 29, 
2020);  see also Jacob Metcalf, Emanuel Moss & danah boyd, Owning Ethics: Corporate Logics, Silicon Valley, 
and the Institutionalization of Ethics, 86 SOCIAL RSCH.: AN INT’L QUARTERLY 14, 14 (2019) (“Despite 
differences between these theorists, a central lesson of the ordinary ethics model is that ethics as practice is 
foundationally a tension between the everydayness of the present and the possibility of a different, better 
everydayness.”). 
 200. Shannon Vallor et al., Conceptual Frameworks in Technology and Engineering Practice: Ethical Lenses 
to Look Through, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS (2018), https://www.scu.edu/ethics-in-technology-
practice/ethical-lenses/. 
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risks, you need to balance this value with appropriately limited moral 
paternalism (which is also unethical in excess.).”201 Ethics alone is 
unlikely to provide the certainty that policymakers, computer scientists, 
and engineers seek. First, ethical and philosophical concepts can be 
abstract, ambiguous, and inaccessible to most people.202 Second, as legal 
scholar Elettra Bietti observes, ethics has been criticized because 
“[l]aying out general abstract principles without explaining how they 
apply to real life situations seems to falls short when it comes to making 
sense of urgent social problems, such as many of those that arise in 
relation to new technologies.”203 Indeed, AI ethics-based frameworks 
“have thus far largely produced vague, high-level principles and value 
statements which promise to be action-guiding, but in practice, provide 
few specific recommendations and fail to address fundamental 
normative and political tensions embedded in key concepts (e.g. fairness, 
privacy).”204  
 
• Certainty and Human Rights: Human rights refers to not only a set of 
philosophical and moral beliefs about inalienable rights, but also to the 
specific instantiation of those rights in binding legal commitments across 
the international community.205 For this reason, in debates about AI 
governance, advocates of human rights frameworks note that this 
approach offers certainty because human rights “are enshrined in law and 
 
 201. Id. Other ethical frameworks also present their own challenges. Consequentialist ethics, for example, is 
“attractive to many engineers because in theory, it implies the ability to quantify the ethical analysis and select 
for the optimal outcome . . . .” Id. But in practice, technology’s divergent effects over time and different 
populations, make such calculations “intractable.” Id. Virtue ethics is explicitly premised on the belief that “ethics 
cannot be approached like mathematics; there is no algorithm for ethics, and moral life is not a well-defined, 
closed problem for which one could design a single, optimal solution.” Id. 
 202. Elettra Bietti, From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing, PROCEEDINGS TO ACM FAT CONFERENCE, 10, 4 
(2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3513182 (“First, philosophy is sometimes criticized 
for being abstract and for not being accessible to large audiences . . . .“); Metcalf, Moss & Boyd, supra note 199, 
at 5 (“[T]he ambiguity of the term [ethics] is central to the challenge of capturing what it means to ‘own ethics’ 
in the technology sector.”). 
 203. Bietti, supra note 202, at 4. 
 204. Mittelstadt, supra note 198, at 1. 
 205. See FILIPPO A. RASO ET AL., Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks 8 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3259344 (“While there are many different conceptions of 
human rights, from the philosophical to the moral, we in this project take a legal approach. We view human rights 
in terms of the binding legal commitments the international community has articulated in the three landmark 
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arguably should not be derogated.”206 That said, although there have 
been efforts to map out relationships between AI applications and 
specific human rights,207 Bendert Zevebergen, an expert on AI ethics, 
has observed that any clarity that comes from human rights norms and 
values exists because that “meaning has been developed and specified 
through jurisprudence,”208 and such jurisprudence does not yet exist for 
AI, and may never exist.209  
In the absence of certainty from law, ethics, and human rights frameworks, it may 
be that AI governance frameworks are increasingly invoking risk governance, 
precisely because the quantified forms of risk governance offer the illusion of 
certainty that is unavailable in other frameworks.  
B. Certainty and Silicon Valley 
When it comes to AI governance, neither law, nor ethics, nor human rights seems 
able to offer much operational certainty to AI developers or policymakers. But does 
a quantitative measure of risk offer any greater level of operational certainty? Putting 
aside for a moment the inherent problems of the quantitative approach, a quantified 
approach to risk governance would certainly provide greater operational certainty 
than other approaches.210 Recall the European Commission’s AI Act that proposed 
subjecting high-risk applications to new restrictions.211 If it were possible to ex ante 
quantifiably and objectively measure the risk of a new potential AI system, a 
company would be able to quickly make important business decisions about the costs 
of bringing the system to market, the regulatory hurdles, the operational complexity, 
and so on. By contrast, qualitative measures of risk may leave companies unsure of 
whether their AI system will be classified as low risk or high risk, whether different 
jurisdictions will reach different conclusions, and the factors that may ultimately 
influence that decision.212 Thus, the appeal of quantitative measures of risk is 
apparent, particularly in the absence of other operational guidance from law, ethics, 
or human rights frameworks. 
 
 206. Mark Latonero, Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: A Workshop at Data & Society, POINTS: DATA 
& SOC’Y (May 11, 2018), https://points.datasociety.net/artificial-intelligence-human-rights-a-workshop-at-data-
society-fd6358d72149. 
 207. See generally RASO ET AL., supra note 205, at 8. 
 208. Bendert Zevenbergen, Marrying Ethics and Human Rights for AI Scrutiny, CONSIDERATI, 
https://www.considerati.com/publications/marrying-ethics-and-human-rights-for-ai-scrutiny.html. 
 209. Id. (“Assessing the design and deployment of a technology in society through an ethical lens means that 
the decisions and technical design are scrutinized, and the reasoning is justified by considering alternative 
approaches. Such review will not [necessarily] be conducted in a court of law, but can happen internally at a 
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 210. See supra Part III.B. 
 211. AI Act, supra note 37, at Title III, Chapter. 2.  
 212. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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Corporate culture in general may tend to favor certainty over ambiguity,213 but the 
pull toward certainty may be particularly strong within some of Silicon Valley’s 
biggest companies—where quantification is, in many ways, a deeply engrained 
trait.214 This is evident in the work that Jacob Metcalf, Emanuel Moss, and danah 
boyd did, documenting interviews with 17 individuals who “own” ethics at some of 
Silicon Valley’s most well-known companies.215 For example, one of those 
informants described her role as translating amorphous principles into the more 
concrete language of the company: “she repeatedly gestured to her role as someone 
who translates external norms and pressures into practices that are internally 
tractable—for example, rendering the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a practical guideline for screening out problematic enterprise clientele, or finding 
ways to align revenue-generating metrics (‘clicks’) with an ethically robust model of 
value for platform users.”216 In other words, ambiguity struggles in a world 
dominated by Objectives and Key Results (OKRs) and Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs)—the standard measures of success within companies. 
This pull toward certainty is also evident in the deep (and problematic) belief in 
Silicon Valley about technological solutionism—the belief that technology can solve 
society’s problems.217 As Metcalf, Moss, and boyd observed, “[t]echnological 
solutionism contributes to an optimistic search for best practices—the optimal set of 
checklists, procedures, or evaluative metrics that will ensure an ethical product.”218 
By extension, this means that anything that cannot be easily distilled down to a 
checklist will either be ignored, or so over-simplified that it only offers the “illusion 
of completion, and in doing so impl[ies] that ethics ‘has been done.’”219 And we have 
even seen examples of this in recent AI governance frameworks. For example, the 
EU’s High-Level Expert Group on Trustworthy AI developed a “Trustworthy AI 
Assessment” that is essentially a checklist for AI ethics.220 And while some of the 
elements of the checklist can prompt deep self-reflection about AI,221 others are 
 
 213. See Christiaan van Veen, Artificial Intelligence: What’s Human Rights Got To Do With It?, POINTS: 
DATA & SOCIETY (2018), https://points.datasociety.net/artificial-intelligence-whats-human-rights-got-to-do-
with-it-4622ec1566d5 (“The problem with this ethics paradigm in corporate strategies is that ethical values such 
as fairness or inclusiveness have no widely agreed-upon meaning. The inherent nebulousness of such ethical 
principles makes them rather unhelpful to ensure ‘good.’”). 
 214. See Todd, supra note 110, at 200. 
 215. Metcalf, Moss, and boyd, supra note 199, at 5. 
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 220. INDEPENDENT HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GRP. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 69, at 1. 
 221. See, e.g., Id. (“Did you carry out a fundamental rights impact assessment where there could be a negative 
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closer to Metcalf, Moss, and boyd’s “illusion of completion.”222 Between the need to 
express things in measurable indicators and in checklists, it is clear why there exists 
a strong cultural pull toward certainty within the companies developing AI 
technologies. 
This helps us perhaps understand why we see the current proliferation of risk 
governance frameworks for AI. AI developers, the companies they work for, and 
policymakers are all seeking concrete, operational guidance on how to respond to the 
many pressing challenges of AI. And yet law, ethics, and human rights frameworks 
all come up short. What remains is an approach—risk governance—that offers the 
illusion of certainty. This certainty, however, comes from only one approach to risk 
governance, and in the absence of any forethought or consideration otherwise, it is 
that version of risk governance—the quantified version—that will dominate AI 
governance. 
V. Embracing Uncertainty in AI: A Framework for AI Governance 
AI governance faces an important choice as it embraces the language of “risk 
governance”: 1) follow the quantitative approach to risk governance that celebrates 
the false illusion of scientific certainty at the cost of ignoring a range of critical-yet-
difficult-to-quantify societal impacts, or 2) follow the more qualitative approach that 
is better able to adapt to the challenge of governing a complex, quickly evolving 
technology, at the cost of certainty, predictability, consistency, and transparency. The 
critical thing, however, is to recognize that there is a choice. In the absence of that 
recognition, the powerful undercurrents of culture, politics, and technology that favor 
certainty will make that choice for us. But by recognizing that choice, we can 
thoughtfully design risk governance systems for AI that respect both quantitative and 
qualitative measures of risk. 223 
AI governance has an important choice to make. And although there are factors 
that may push AI governance toward the quantitative approach,224 there are 
numerous examples of emerging technologies adopting qualitative frameworks.225 
Although qualitative frameworks—like those developed at the International Risk 
Governance Center226—may not be a perfect fit for the AI governance space, they at 
least provide a starting point for designing a more inclusive approach to AI 
 
 222. See, e.g., Id. (“Did you put in place a series of steps to increase the system’s accuracy?”). 
 223. Cf. STIRLING, supra note 104, at 2 (“It is true that neither an ‘anything goes’ [totally permissive] 
approach, nor a ‘stop everything’ [totally restrictive] approach to the regulation of technology offers a valid, 
feasible or desirable way forward. Fortunately, however, neither the ‘narrow risk-based’ nor the ‘precautionary’ 
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 224. See supra Part IV. 
 225. See supra Part III.C. 
 226. See IRGC, supra note 76, at 12, Figure 2. 
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governance that reflects both quantitative and qualitative measures of risk, and 
accepts a certain level of uncertainty. 
As AI governance moves forward, it will hopefully begin to adopt a more nuanced 
understanding of risk governance based on some of the lessons and frameworks that 
emerge from other scientific fields. From those other fields, two related themes 
emerge that may help guide future AI governance approaches to risk. First, we must 
not seek the one true answer; when dealing with emerging, quickly evolving 
technologies, uncertainty is the rule, not the exception. Second, given that 
uncertainty, we must give weight to all perspectives on risk and the societal impacts 
of AI technology; we must not presume to know which perspectives to hear and 
which to ignore.  
A. Embracing the Messy and Uncertain 
We must stop expecting science (or for that matter law, ethics, or human rights) 
to be an all-knowing oracle.227 It is simply unreasonable to expect that some of the 
most difficult questions that we must grapple with as a society can have simple, one-
dimensional answers.228 The challenges are difficult, the solutions are imperfect, and 
reasonable, rational people will disagree. AI governance should embrace that. As 
Mittlestadt observed, “Ethics is not meant to be easy or formulaic. Intractable 
principled disagreements should be expected and welcomed, as they reflect both 
serious ethical consideration and diversity of thought. They do not represent failure, 
and do not need to be ‘solved’. Ethics is a process, not a destination.”229 
Thinking about AI governance as a process, and an uncertain one at that, is a 
necessary consequence of the fact that AI is a complex tool embedded in a complex 
societies. As such, the impacts of AI are complex, varied across time, people, and 
place, and quickly evolving.230 This means that there is not just one single value at 
stake, but a range of competing values. Political philosopher and expert on AI ethics, 
Annette Zimmermann, along with Zevenbergen, noted that because of these 
competing values, it is impossible to “optimize for everything at once,” and we 
instead need a system that allows us to consider these ethical tradeoffs.231 Moreover, 
this is a process that must occur over and over.232 
This embrace of complexity and uncertainty is a key lesson that has emerged from 
the evolution of risk governance in other scientific domains. Because of 
 
 227. BERNSTEIN, supra note 182, at 336. 
 228. See supra notes 107 and 116 and accompanying text. 
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 232. Id. (“[E]thical reasoning cannot be a static one-off assessment: it required an ongoing process of 
reflection, deliberation, and contestation.”). 
Budish (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2021 9:53 PM 
AI’s Risky Business 
294 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
technological imperatives, techno-solutionism, and cultural affinity to certainty, this 
may be a difficult shift for Silicon Valley and its regulators, but there are actually 
already examples of technology companies successfully operating within areas of 
ambiguity. Notably, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) is an organization launched 
in 2008 to advance human rights in the ICT sector.233 Grounded in a set of principles 
relating to freedom of expression, privacy, and other human rights,234 GNI and its 
member companies, which include Facebook, Microsoft, and Google among 
others,235 have had to navigate the challenge of monitoring adherence to relatively 
abstract principles. Through the development of human rights impact assessments 
and member-company audits, among other tools, GNI and the companies involved 
in the process have successfully developed and deployed tools that engage diverse 
stakeholders in advancing the GNI principles across the ICT sector.236 Thus, some of 
the most advanced AI companies, have already demonstrated an ability to 
successfully work within more qualitative governance frameworks. 
B. Embracing Diverse Stakeholders 
In a world where competing values must be a weighed against one another, every 
stakeholder has a perspective that ultimately brings us closer to better understanding 
the true risks, impacts, and opportunities of AI. While quantitative approaches to risk 
governance emphasize the role of scientific experts, almost to the exclusion of 
everyone else, the more qualitative forms of risk governance demonstrate a 
commitment to multistakeholder engagement.237 Given the deep and profound 
societal impacts that AI is likely to have around the world, it is important for risk 
governance of AI to also embrace a diversity of perspectives. 
Ensuring that risk governance of AI is sufficiently multistakeholder is perhaps 
less of a leap than embracing uncertainty. First, several sets of AI principles already 
discuss the importance of diverse stakeholders in the risk governance process. Most 
notably, the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI stated that 
“The benefits of AI systems are many, and Europe needs to ensure that they are 
available to all. This requires an open discussion and the involvement of social 
 
 233. See Global Network Initiative, GNI: A Journey of Trust and Making Common Cause by Michael 
Samway, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2018), https://medium.com/global-network-initiative-collection/gni-a-journey-of-
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 235. Our Members - Global Network Initiative, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/#home-menu (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). 
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partners and stakeholders, including the general public. Many organisations already 
rely on stakeholder panels to discuss the use of AI systems and data analytics. These 
panels include various members, such as legal experts, technical experts, ethicists, 
consumer representatives and workers. Actively seeking participation and dialogue 
on the use and impact of AI systems supports the evaluation of results and 
approaches, and can particularly be helpful in complex cases.”238 And similar 
sentiments are echoed in the Toronto Declaration, a document prepared by Amnesty 
International, Access Now, and other representatives from academia and civil 
society,239 and the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies.240 
Second, many organizations that are leaders in AI also have extensive experience in 
multistakeholder governance from the Internet governance space.241 Thus, there 
already exists some familiarity with, and acceptance of, multistakeholder governance 
models, which lays a helpful foundation for risk governance of AI. 
That said, there remains a gap between stating the importance of including a 
diversity of stakeholder perspectives and actually giving diverse voices power to 
effect governance outcomes. For example, the OECD published an ancillary report 
to its AI principles, entitled “Scoping the AI Principles,” intended to give greater 
depth and background to the principles based on the discussions of the OECD’s 
Expert Group on AI that drafted the principles.242 To its credit, the OECD’s scoping 
report identifies a diverse array of stakeholders encompassing “all public and private 
sector organisations and individuals involved in, or affected by, AI systems, directly 
or indirectly. They include, inter alia, civil society, the technical and academic 
communities, industry, governments, labour representatives and trade unions as well 
as individuals as workers or data subjects.”243 And although the scoping report 
instructs those who develop, deploy, and use AI to identify the relevant stakeholders 
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and assess the risks for those stakeholders, nowhere does it describe a mechanism 
for those stakeholders to participate meaningfully in the process.244 
Here too, risk governance in other scientific fields can be instructive for the AI 
governance process. For example, in order to assess and weigh the risks of new 
technologies in other scientific fields, risk governance models have incorporated 
mechanisms like citizen juries and consensus conferences,245 which can supplement 
other expert-centric mechanisms.246 One model is the constructive technology 
assessment, which, in places like the Netherlands, has allowed a range of 
stakeholders to play an active role in helping to shape the development of new 
technologies from a very early stage.247 Consensus conferences, which have been 
successful in Denmark, take a different approach, largely eschewing stakeholder 
labels, and instead creating a dialogue between an expert panel and a lay panel.248 
The consensus conference operates from the belief that the expert panel has just as 
much to learn from the lay panel as the lay panel can learn from the expert panel; 
“[b]oth of the panels are given the opportunity to learn. The lay members become 
informed, pose questions and undertake discussion with the experts and with each 
other.”249 Similarly, the Global Network Initiative is a multistakeholder process that 
many of the largest ICT companies are already familiar with.250 The purpose here is 
not to evaluate the relative merits of all of these models, but to highlight that there 
exist formal, deliberative models that not only allow diverse voices the chance to be 
heard, but also to actually shape the development of emerging technologies. And 
these models can serve as inspiration for informing risk governance of AI. 
Of course, giving power to diverse voices comes with risks, questions, and 
uncertainty. How, for instance, should public perceptions of risk be weighed against 
scientific, technical, or economic data that may refute those perceptions?251 And are 
there ways to prevent biases, such as a fear of the unknown, from unduly distorting 
the governance of emerging technologies?252 The experiences from other 
applications of risk governance suggests that these are surmountable hurdles, but in 
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the end, embracing uncertainty means that some risks and some questions remain 
just that.  
VI. Conclusion 
In 1986, over a decade before he helped define the field of cyberlaw, Charles 
Nesson, one of the foremost experts on evidence, wrote an article examining the role 
of statistical proof in toxic tort litigation.253 Nesson was reacting to a decision as part 
of the Agent Orange litigation involving thousands of servicemen who were exposed 
to the chemical dioxin during the Vietnam War.254 This decision held that evidence 
provided by some of the plaintiffs was inadmissible because there was no scientific 
proof connecting exposure to Agent Orange and the health impacts that the plaintiffs 
suffered.255 Nesson acknowledged, that the science connecting Agent Orange to 
“human illness is likely to remain murky for a long time.”256 If juries were allowed 
to consider that uncertainty, it is true that reasonable juries may reach very different 
results. But such inconsistency is only problematic if you believe that the role of the 
judicial system to discover the one true truth.257 But as Nesson argued then, 
inconsistency of verdicts is not the problem, instead the concern should be fairness: 
“Surely the more just plaintiffs’ recoveries seem, the less concern there will be about 
inconsistency.”258 
Nearly 40 years later the challenge remains the same. It is true that embracing 
uncertainty in AI governance will lead to inconsistent outcomes.259 For some, 
quantification of risk and the embrace of scientific certainty is necessary for 
objectivity, legitimacy, and even fairness. To these people, inconsistency is 
incompatible with those aims.260 As the OECD stated in their report on risk 
governance: “A decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other 
sort) has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity 
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thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. 
Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity 
lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.”261 But, as this paper 
has shown, there are many aspects of AI’s risks that we cannot yet quantify and 
maybe will never will.262 In the absence of that scientific certainty, can we instead 
build a governance system that is fair and just, even if it is inconsistent, messy, and 
unpredictable? 
As Peter Bernstein wrote in his history of risk: 
“Bernoulli and Einstein and Einstein may be correct that God does not 
play with dice, but for better or for worse and in spite of all our efforts, 
human beings do not enjoy complete knowledge of the laws that define 
the order of the objectively existing world. Bernoulli and Einstein were 
scientists concerned with the behavior of the natural world, but human 
beings must contend with the behavior of something beyond the patterns 
of nature: themselves. Indeed, as civilization has pushed forward, 
nature’s vagaries have mattered less and the decisions of people have 
mattered more.”263 
In the search for a fair and just system of AI governance, ultimately the greatest 
risks posed by AI are inherently human risks and not technical ones.264 These are 
risks about how we choose to use AI systems—for both good and bad. These are 
risks that entail difficult trade-offs of competing ethical values.265 These are risks that 
require us to consider how we choose to define fairness and justice, and in defining 
those risks, whose voices bear weight. For AI governance, there are no oracles and 
no one right answer.266 To manage the risks of AI, we ultimately need to design a 
system that lets us manage the risks of being human in an imperfect and uncertain 
world. 
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